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ECONOMIC DAMAGES UNDER THE OIL
POLLUTION ACT OF 1990:
THE CASE FOR THE EXCLUSION OF A
PROXIMATE CAUSE REQUIREMENT*
EMILY C. ADLER**
INTRODUCTION

The beach in St. Petersburg, Florida is pristine.' The pure white sand
glistens in the sun as clear blue waves crash upon the shore. The cool ocean
air fills the guest rooms of countless beachfront resorts, the white linen
curtains dance in the summer breeze. Days like this are what drive the
vibrant tourism industry in West Florida.2 There is only one problem. The
beaches and hotels are empty.
Keith Overton, owner of the TradeWinds Resort in St. Petersburg,
Florida reported a decline in profits of more than $1 million dollars this
year as compared with his average earnings over the last three years. 3 The
cancellations and reservations-that-never-came were not because of any
dereliction in the upkeep at TradeWinds or because of a downed economy.
Rather, the losses came because tourists the world over think that St.
Petersburg (and beaches throughout the Gulf Coast) are covered in oil as a
result of the catastrophic Deepwater Horizon oil spill. 4 "Black-crude
* This note won First Place in the 2012 St. John's University School of Law Perspectives on Justice
Best Student Note Writing Competition.
** J.D., cum laude,, June 2012, St. John's University School of Law; B.A., summa cum laude, Political
Science, Queens College, May 2009.
1 Facts adapted from David Segal, Should BP's Money Go Where the Oil Didn't?,N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
23, 2010, at BUI (evaluating the issue of proximity claims in the wake of Deepwater Horizon); see Gulf
Oil Spill, STPETE.ORG (Sept. 17, 2010), http://www.stpete.org/news/gulf oil spill.asp (indicating that
the beaches in St. Petersburg are experiencing no impacts from the gulf oil spill).
2 See Segal, supra note 1, at BU1 (discussing the impact of the oil spill on Florida's $60 billion-ayear tourist trade); see also Tim Padgett, Florida Hopes for Best but Bracefor Oil Spill, TIMECOM
(May 20, 2010), available at http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1990589,00.html
(commenting on Florida's struggle to persuade tourists to visit in the wake of the epic oil spill).
3 Segal, supra note 1, at BUl; Steve Huettel, BP Oil Spill Fund Now Open to Tampa Bay Area
Claims, TAMPABAY.COM (Oct. 4, 2010), http://www.tampabay.com/news/business/tourism/bp-oil-spillfund-now-open-to-tampa-bay-area-claims/i 125866.
4 Mr. Overton related a conversation an employee had with his mother in Bosnia who asked
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hysteria" has set in, and Mr. Overton wants British Petroleum (BP) to
compensate him for the money he would have earned but for the spill. 5
Brian Barr, a member of the plaintiffs' executive committee in the BP
case, claims that "the entire tourism industry in this state has been impacted
by people's fear that the oil was going to hit Florida, whether those fears
were reasonable or not." 6 The reality of the situation is that industries all
over the country have been impacted by the spill. From a manufacturer in
Tennessee stuck with 10,000 "I Love Pensacola" T-shirts to a restaurateur
in New York whose diminution of supply of Gulf-fresh fish has resulted in
diminished profits, the entire country is feeling the loss. 7 The legal question
thus becomes whether the thousands of people proximately affected by
Deepwater Horizon have a valid claim against BP for lost profits. 8
Kenneth Feinberg, the claims administrator appointed by BP and
President Barack Obama, has publically stated that he would not consider
payment of "proximity claims" (i.e. claims based on indirect harm) 9 such
as those mentioned above. 10 This decision stems from Feinberg's
interpretation of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA) provision on

whether her son was going to lose his job because the beach was covered in oil. Segal, supra note 1, at
BUL See Greg Allen, A Year after Gulf Oil Spill, FloridaSees a Comeback, NPR.ORG (Apr. 18, 2011),
http://www.npr.org/2011/04/18/135326540/a-year-after-deepwater-florida-sees-a-comeback.
5 Segal, supra note 1, at BUl. Rob Shaw, Nearly Year After BP Spill, FloridaResidents Wait for
Disaster Claims, TAMPA BAY ONLINE (Apr. 15, 2011), http://www2.tbo.com/news/oilspill/201 1/apr/15/l/nearly-year-after-bp-spill-florida-residents-wait--ar-197018/.
6 On October 8, 2010, U.S. District Court Judge Carl Barbier of the Eastern District of Louisiana
appointed 15 lawyers to the Plaintiffs Steering Committee of the BP oil spill multidistrict litigation.
Four of these lawyers were appointed to a Plaintiffs Executive Committee. The purpose of the
committees is to efficiently and effectively manage discovery and pretrial matters in the litigation
process. LexisNexis Litigation Resource Community Staff, Judge Appoints BP Oil Plaintifs' Steering,
PM),
2010,
3:17
(Oct.
14,
LEXISNEXIS
Committees,
Executive
http://www.lexisnexis.com/community/litigationresourcecenter/blogs/litigationblog/archive/2010/10/14
/federal-court-appoints-bp-oil-plaintiffs-steering-committee.aspx; see David Segal, Should BP's Money
Go Where the OilDidn't?,N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2010, at BUL.
7 Segal, supra note 1, at BUI (evaluating the breadth of potential proximity claims in the aftermath
of Deepwater Horizon); BP Oil Spill: Prosecutors Reportedly Preparing Criminal Charges,
HUFFINGTONPOST.COM (Dec. 29, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/12/29/bp-oil-spilln 1174542.html (discussing that businesses around the country have been forced to contend with the
spill's aftermath).
8 This note was written in 2011. Since then BP entered a $7.8 billion dollar partial settlement
agreement with the Deepwater Horizon plaintiffs. While this development brings relief to many of the
claimants affected by the disaster, the legal question of whether the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 includes a
requirement of a showing of proximate cause remains unresolved. This issue is the primary focus of this
note. CNN Wire Staff, BP, Plaintiffs Reach Billion DollarDeal in Gulf Oil Spill, CNN.CoM (Mar. 3,
2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/03/02/business/bp-oil-spill-trial-agreement/.
9 The term "proximity claim" refers to arguments of indirectharm. Segal, supra note 1, at BU I.
10 Id. ("Until early October, Kenneth Feinberg, the longtime mediator and the lawyer in charge of
administering the spill fund, said publicly that he wouldn't consider such claims, in part because he
thought they would open a door that thousands of businesses across the country would try to walk
through."). See supra text accompanying notes 1-7.
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economic loss to include a proximate cause requirement.1 1 This note will
challenge this interpretation of OPA as well as the decision not to pay such
claims. More specifically, this note will argue that the proximate cause
requirement has been conspicuously omitted from OPA and to require
claimants to prove proximate cause is to establish a standard of recovery
stricter than the statute envisioned. Furthermore, the objective of this note
is to provide interpretive value to OPA that exceeds the scope of the current
Deepwater Horizon controversy. Part II will provide a statutory analysis of
OPA, looking at plain meaning and legislative history, as well as a
comparison of interpretations of federal statutes dealing with oil spills and
the release of hazardous materials. Included in this part will be a critique of
John C.P. Goldberg's memo to Feinberg arguing for the inclusion of a
proximate cause standard. While no court has rendered a decision finding
for or against the inclusion of proximate cause, Part III of this note will
analyze judicial interpretations of OPA which nonetheless lend significant
support for this note's interpretation of OPA. Finally, Part IV will discuss
policy considerations implicated by the exclusion of a proximate cause
standard and suggest implementation of the Radial Causation Doctrine, an
original theory aimed at the improvement and refinement of OPA.
I. BACKGROUND
On April 20, 2010, the Deepwater Horizon oil rig exploded in the Gulf
of Mexico. 12 The rig, which was considered one of the largest and most
sophisticated rigs in the world, exploded as a result of a blowout in the
Macondo exploration site, approximately 50 miles southeast of Venice,
Louisiana. 13 Oil spilled into the gulf for 86 days, until it was successfully
capped on July 15, 2010.14 It is estimated that 4.9 million barrels, or 205.8
11 The Gulf Coast Claims Fund EAP Protocol states, "[t]he GCCF; will only pay for harm or
damage proximately caused by the spill. The GCCF's causation determinations of OPA claims will be
guided by OPA and federal law interpreting OPA and the proximate cause doctrine." Protocolfor
Emergency Advance Payments, GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILITY (Aug. 23, 2010), available at
http://www.gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com/protol1.php, Para. H.F (emphasis added).
12 Denise M. Pilie, Satisfying Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Claims: Will Ken Feinberg's Process
Work?, 58 LA. B. J. 176, 177 (2010) (commenting on the legal concerns and criticisms of the BP claims
process and noting the criticisms facing Feinberg's administration tasks); see Stephen Gidiere, Mike
Freeman & Mary Samuels, The Coming Wave of Gulf Coast Oil Spill Litigation, 71 ALA. LAw. 374,
374 (2010) (noting the interaction of OPA and state law in upcoming Deepwater Horizon litigation).
13 Campbell Robertson, Search Continues After Oil Rig Blast, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2010, at A13
(reporting on the 11 missing rig workers who were ultimately counted as casualties of the explosion).
CNN Wire Staff, At Least 11 Missing After Blast on Oil Rig in Gulf, CNN.COM (Apr. 21, 2010),
http://articles.cnn.com/2010-04-21/us/oil.rig.explosionl-rig-coast-guard-rear-admdrilling?_s=PM:US.
14 Campbell Robertson & Clifford Krauss, Gulf Spill Is The Largest of Its Kind, Scientists Say,
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million gallons, of oil have been discharged into the Gulf.15 Pursuant to
OPA, BP was named the responsible party.16 That designation imposed
strict liability on BP for removal costs and damages.17 In June 2010, BP
established a "comprehensive claims process" with a $20 billion fund for
the payment of damages to those affected by the disaster.18 BP and
President Obama jointly appointed Kenneth Feinberg, perhaps the most
experienced mass claims administrator in the United States, to oversee the
administration of the fund.19
Feinberg has mandated that claimants show that the spill was a
proximate cause of their economic loss in order to recover from BP.20 The
validity of this decision depends entirely on whether OPA requires
claimants who suffered a loss in profits or impaired earning capacity to
prove a level of causation beyond actual cause, namely proximate cause.
The doctrine of Proximate Cause, which will be further developed below, is
less a bright-line rule and more a policy consideration aimed at limiting
potentially endless liability. 2 1 The inclusion of a proximate cause
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2010, at A14 (finding that the 4.9 million barrels discharged in the Deepwater
Horizon oil spill outstrips the estimated 3.3 million barrels spilled into the Bay of Campeche by the
Mexican rig Ixtoc I in 1979, previously believed to be the world's largest accidental release of oil).
Cutler Cleveland, Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EARTH, available at
http://www.eoearth.org/article/Deepwater Horizon oil spill (last updated Feb. 8, 2012).
15 Id. at A14; Pilie, supra note 12, at 177 (introducing the oil spill in the context of the claims
process).
16 The U.S. Coast Guard has named BP the responsible party pursuant to OPA, 33 U.S.C. §2701.
BP has accepted that designation and has agreed to bear the liability associated with such designation.
Letter from James Dupree, President, BP Exploration and Prod. Inc. to Thomas Morrison, Chief,
Claims
Div.,
U.S.
Coast
Guard
(May
3,
2010)
available
at
http://www.uscg.mil/foialdocs/DWH/2094.pdf; Terrell Arline, The Deepwater Horizon Claims Process
for
Local
Government,
3
FLA.
Ass'N
COUNTIES,
http://flcounties.com/Does/Legal/Oil%2OLegal%2OTask%20Force/memo%20on%20claims
0
%20process%20by /o20ta%201 1.1.10.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2012).
17 See Gidiere et al., supra note 12, at 375-76 (finding that under OPA, responsible parties are
strictly liable for damages caused by an oil spill and the cleanup of it). See also Arline, supranote 16, at
2 (stating that OPA makes a responsible party strictly liable for direct recovery and remediation costs
plus certain damages incurred by local governments as a result of an oil spill).
18 Pilie, supra note 12, at 177 (introducing the oil spill in the context of the claims process). BP
Establishes $20 Billion Claims Fundfor Deepwater Horizon Spill and Outlines Dividend Decisions,
BP.coM
(June
16,
2010),
http://www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?categoryld=2012968&contentld=7062966.
19 Feinberg is also the trust administrator for the September 11 Victims Compensation Fund. He
also served as mediator of a class-action lawsuit filed by 250,000 veterans suffering from the effects of
"Agent Orange." Pilie, supra note 12, at 177; Kenneth Feinberg, NYTIMES.COM,
http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/people/f/kennethr_feinberg/index.html
(last
updated Mar. 5, 2012).
20 "The GCCF will only pay for harm or damage proximately caused by the spill. The GCCF's
causation determinations of OPA claims will be guided by OPA and federal law interpreting OPA and
the proximate cause doctrine." Supra note 11 (emphasis added); see text accompanying notes 9-11; see
also ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, ONE YEAR AFTER THE GULF OIL SPILL: IS JUSTICE BEING SERVED? 9

(2011).
21 See infra note 49.
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requirement in OPA would justify Feinberg's mandate that claimants
establish that the responsible party's conduct was a not only a "substantial
factor" in bringing about the harm but also that the loss was a foreseeable
consequence of the spill. 22 Such a burden would prove difficult for
proximity claimants to satisfy, and would require a greater showing of
cause than is required under OPA.
II. A STATUTORY ANALYSIS OF OPA AND THE ARGUMENT FOR THE
INTENTIONAL EXCLUSION OF A PROXIMATE CAUSE REQUIREMENT

This part of the note focuses on the statutory construction of OPA and
uses John C.P. Goldberg's memo to Feinberg to provide structure to the
analysis. 23 Goldberg, a Harvard Law professor, was commissioned by
Feinberg to write a memo about liability for economic loss in connection
with the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. 24 Part A will refute Goldberg's
conclusion that OPA includes an implied proximate cause requirement. 25
This section will provide a context for the statutory analysis of OPA and
delve into the plain meaning of the statute. Part B will rework Goldberg's
comparison of OPA to the interpretations of CERCLA (Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act) 26, commonly
known as the "Superfund", and TAPAA (Trans-Alaska Pipeline
Authorization Act).2 7 The objective of this section will be to distinguish
OPA from these other statutes and their respective interpretations which
import a proximate cause requirement. Part C will look at the relevant
legislative history from both the House and Senate to support the claim that
OPA does not include a proximate cause requirement.

22 Id.

23 Memorandum from John C.P. Goldberg to Kenneth Feinberg (Nov. 22, 2010), available at
http://timeecocentric.files.wordpress.com/20 10/ ll/goldberg-memorandum-of-law-20 10.pdf.
24 The purpose of the commissioned memo was not to serve as a blueprint but rather as leverage.
Segal, supra note 1, at BUl. After all, the Gulf Coast Claims Facility had already made public its
decision to interpret OPA as including a proximate cause requirement. See supra note 11. Ultimately,
the memo's purpose was to allow Feinberg to say to those claimants whose proximity claims are weak,
"[y]ou'll get nothing in court, but I'll give you 20-30 cents on the dollar." Segal, supra note 1, at BUl.
25 See Memorandum from John C.P. Goldberg to Kenneth Feinberg, supra note 23 at 20 (finding
that §2702 includes an implied proximate causation requirement because of the use of both "due to" and
"result from" language, as well as a judicial tendency to read in both a proximate cause and an actual
cause requirement where a statute includes stand-alone "result from" language); see also infra text
accompanying notes 32-57.
26 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9607
(1980).
27 Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1653 (1973).
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A. OPA: Context and Plain Meaning
OPA28 was enacted on the heels of the Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989.29
In the wake of what was the largest oil spill in U.S. history, 30 Congress
sought to prevent future spills and mitigate their resulting damage by
requiring oil companies to institute spill prevention plans as well as clean
up technology and equipment. 3 1 In the event of a spill, OPA allows for
recovery of damages in six situations. 32 This note, in order to address
proximity claimants' actions for lost profits, will focus on the Section
2702(b)(2)(E) damage provision for lost profits and earning capacity. 33 In a

28 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-62.
29 Gatlin Oil Co. v. U.S., 169 F. 3d 207, 209 (1999) (holding that the removal costs and damages
provided in section 2702(b) are those that result from a discharge in oil or from a substantial threat of a
discharge of oil into navigable waters or adjacent shorelines). See Gidiere et al., supra note 12, at 375
(providing a context for the adoption of OPA).
30 On March 24, 1989, the tanker Exxon Valdez, en route from Valdez, Alaska to Los Angeles,
California, struck a Bligh Reef in Prince William Sound, Alaska. NOAA/HAZARDOUS MATERIALS
RESPONSE AND ASSESSMENT DIVISION, OIL SPILL CASE HISTORIES 1967-1991: SUMMARIES OF
(1992),
available
at
INTERNATIONAL
SPILLS
80
SIGNIFICANT
U.S.
AND

http://response.restoration.noaa.gov/bookshelf/26 spilldb.pdf. Within six hours of the collision, the
Exxon Valdez spilled approximately 10.9 million gallons of its 53 million gallon cargo of Prudhoe Bay
Crude. Id. The oil eventually impacted over 1,100 miles of coastline in Alaska, making the Exxon
Valdez the largest oil spill in U.S. waters prior to Deepwater Horizon. Id.
31 See Gidiere et al., supranote 12, at 375 (highlighting the objectives of OPA and the mechanisms
it set in place to prevent damage like that of Exxon Valdez). See also David Jackson, Obama Panel
Says More Needs to be Done to Prevent Oil Spills, USA TODAY (Jan. 11, 2011, 1:40 PM), available at
http://content.usatoday.com/communities/theoval/post/2011/01 (explaining that more needs to be done
to prevent oil spills).
32 The six types of damages under OPA are:
Natural resource damages - derive from injury to, destruction of or loss of use of natural resources.
Natural resources by definition belong to the U.S., a state or local government, Indian Tribe, or foreign
government. Thus damages are only recoverable by trustees for these entities. 33 U.S.C. §
2702(b)(2)(A) (1990).
Revenue damages - net loss of tax, royalties, rent, fees or net profit because of the destruction of
property or natural resources. These damages are only recoverable by the U.S., a state or its political
subdivision. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(D) (1990).
Public service damages - the costs for providing means for removal, including protection from fire,
safety or health hazards caused by the discharge of oil. These damages are recoverable only by a state
or its political subdivision. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(F) (1990).
Real orpersonal propertydamages - include injury to, or economic losses from the destruction of real
or personal property. These damages are recoverable by any claimant who owns or leases that property.
33 U.S.C. §2702(b)(2)(B) (1990).
Subsistence use damages - damages for loss of subsistence from use of natural resources, regardless
who the owner of the resources are. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(C) (1990).
Profits and earning capacity damages - equal to lost profits or impairment of earning capacity due to
injury, destruction, or loss of property or natural resources. These damages are recoverable by any
claimant. There is no requirement that the claimant own or lease such property. 33 U.S.C. §
2702(b)(2)(E).
33 33 U.S.C. §2702(b)(2)(E) (1990) (stating that profits and earning capacity damages are equal to
lost profits or impairment in earning capacity due to the injury, destruction, loss of property or natural
resources and may be brought by any claimant).
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departure from traditional maritime law, 34 this provision of OPA awards
damages to those who suffer lost profits or impaired earning capacity but
have not suffered damage to property that they own or lease. 3 5 It is under
this provision that Mr. Overton and those similarly situated may find relief.
In order to make out a claim under Section 2702(b)(2)(E), claimants
must establish: 1) That real or personal property or natural resources were
injured or lost; 2) The claimant's income was reduced resulting from injury
to, destruction of, or loss of property or natural resources and the amount of
the reduction; and 3) The amount of the claimant's profits or earnings in
comparable periods and during the period when the claimed loss or
impairment was suffered, established by income tax returns, financial
statements, etc. 36 Element two summarizes the causation element found in
(b)(2)(E). The actual language of the provision reads: "Damages equal to
the loss of profits or impairment of earning capacity due to the injury,
destruction, or loss of real property, personal property, or natural resources,
which shall be recoverable to any claimant". 37
It is this language that is at the source of the causation requirement
controversy. 38 At first blush, the statute seems to quite obviously exclude
any requirement of causation beyond that the damages be "due to" the
destruction of property or natural resources. 39 In fact, elsewhere in the
statute (Section 2704(c)(1)), similarly in the context of the liability of the
responsible party, the statute does include the term "proximately caused". 40
34 In re Ballard Shipping Co. v. Beach Shellfish, 32 F.3d 623, 625 (1st Cir. 1994) (upholding the
traditional rule that the plaintiffs federal claims for purely economic losses under general maritime law
are barred). See David P. Lewis, The Limits of Liability: Can Alaska Oil Spill Victims Recover Pure
Economic Loss?, 10 ALASKA L. REV. 87, 88 (1993) ("The general maritime law prohibits recovery for
pure economic loss without any connection to a physical injury to person or property.").
35 This rule departs from the decision famously laid out in Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint.,
275 U.S. 303, 309 (1927). Justice Holmes wrote, "[n]o authority need be cited to show that as a general
rule, at least, a tort to the person or property of one man does not make the tortfeasor liable to another
merely because the injured person was under a contract with that other person, unknown to the doer of
wrong. . . . The law does not spread its protection so far." Id. OPA also distinguishes itself from
traditional maritime law insofar as that it doesn't include a proximate cause requirement. See infra text
accompanying notes 32-45.
36 George M. Chalos, A Practical Guide to the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund Claim Submission
Procedures,3 U. DENV. WATER L. REv. 80, 87 (1999) (explaining the statutory mechanisms behind
OPA and the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund).
37 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(E) (1990).
38 Martin J. Davies, director of the Tulane Maritime Law Center at Tulane University Law School
in New Orleans has noted that OPA "doesn't say 'proximately caused by', it says 'due to."' Kristin
Choo, Lawyers See Both Promiseand Problems in the $20 Billion Gulf Coast CompensationFund, 96
A.B.A.J. 34, 34 (2010) (discussing the potential legal repercussions of the BP Deepwater Horizon oil
spill). "Due to" he says, "is a slippery phrase. The big question will be: How far away will the line be
drawn by the courts?" Id.
39 See 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(E) (1990).
40 See 33 U.S.C. § 2704(c) (1990) (providing exceptions to the limits on liabilities where there are
instances of negligence by the responsible party); see also infra text accompanying notes 85-87 .
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It is a fundamental tenet of statutory construction that where Congress
included particular language in one section of a statute but omitted it in
another section of the same act, it is generally presumed that Congress
acted intentionally and purposely in the disparate exclusion. 4 1 Congress's
decision to use the term "proximately" in one provision of OPA and
exclude it in another can be explained using this concept of an inference of
intentional exclusion. 42 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that
where a court, employing traditional tools of statutory construction,
ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue,
that intention is the law and must be given effect.43 Thus, the intentional
exclusion of the term "proximately" in Section (b)(2)(E) requires that this
section be read to specifically exclude a proximate cause requirement.
John C.P. Goldberg's argues that when Section 2702(b)(2)(E) is read
together with Section 2702(a) there is an implied proximate cause standard,
and that this interpretation overcomes this inference of intentional
exclusion because the statute "explicitly" states two distinct causation
requirements. 44 Section 2702(a) says that each responsible party is liable
for the removal costs and damages specified in subsection (b) that result
from such incident. 45 Goldberg argues that the "due to" language in
subsection (b)(2)(E) acts as a modifier on the "result from" language in
subsection (a) and together these subsections impose a proximate cause
standard.46
While this is a clever reading of the statute, Goldberg has not adequately
shown that this "second-layer causation requirement" necessarily implies
the inclusion of a proximate cause standard. 47 Moreover, even if subsection
(b)(2)(E)'s language does act as a modifier on (a)'s "result from" language,
it does not implicitly follow that there is a proximate cause requirement.4 8
41 Russello v. U.S., 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (quoting U.S. v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th
Cir.1972)). See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 777 (2008) (applying clear Congressional intent to
statutory construction).
42 Russello, 464 U.S. at 23 (identifying the presumption that where Congress uses particular
language in provision, the exclusion of that same language in another provision is intentional).
43 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. N.R.D.C. Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n. 9 (1984). See, e.g., Yellow Transp.,
Inc. v. Michigan, 537 U.S. 36, 45 (2002) (applying Chevron analysis to the Interstate Commerce
Commission's interpretation of a statute).
44 See Memo from John C.P. Goldberg to Kenneth Feinberg, supra note 23, at 16. See also id at 21
n. 42 ("However, as explained above, the interpretation of OPA provided here now does not rest on
finding in Section 2702(b)(2)(E) an implicit proximate cause limitation of a sort that might run afoul of
the Russello inference of intentional exclusion. Rather, it rests on the fact that OPA explicitly sets two
distinct causation-related requirements for claims seeking recovery from economic loss . . .
45 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (1990).
46 See Memo from John C.P. Goldberg to Kenneth Feinberg, supra note 23, at 20.
47 Id.
48 The reading of the two subsections together simply mandate that (1) the damages (to property
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Judge Cardozo famously held in the landmark case Palsgrafv. Long Island
Railroad Co. that proximate cause was essentially a foreseeability
standard. 49 Cardozo wrote, "The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the
duty to be obeyed, and risk imports relation; it is risk to another or to others
within the range of apprehension." 5 0 However, the reading of subsections
(a) and (b)(2)(E) advocated by Goldberg does not import any requirement
of foreseeability or "range of apprehension" analysis into the statute. 5 1 The
requirement that the claimant's loss in profits be caused by damage that
resulted from the discharge of oil is not the same thing as a requirement
that the loss in profits be the proximate cause of the discharge of oil (i.e. be
a foreseeable consequence of the discharge). Therefore, Goldberg's
argument that OPA Section 2702(b)(2)(E) bypasses the inference of
intentional exclusion because of an implied proximate cause is
unsubstantiated and thus directly contradicts the inferred congressional
intent. 52
Goldberg also argues that when confronted with variations of the standand natural resources) resulted from the discharge of oil, and (2) the claimant has suffered a loss in
profits or impairment of earning capacity due to such damage.
49 162 N.E. 99, 99-100 (1928). Palsgrafinvolved a certain Mrs. Palsgraf who was injured by
falling scales on a Long Island Railroad train platform. The incident was precipitated by two railroad
employees who assisted a passenger carrying a package, catch and board a moving train. One of the
employees pushed the passenger, from behind, causing the passenger to drop the package on the rails.
Unbeknownst to the railroad employees, this package contained fireworks, and the package exploded
when it hit the rails. The shock knocked down scales at the other end of the platform which injured Mrs.
Palsgraf. Palsgraf sued the railroad, claiming her injury resulted from negligent acts of the employee.
50 Id. at 100. See D.E. Buckner, Annotation, Foreseeability as an Element of Negligence and
Proximate Cause, 100 A.L.R.2d 942 § 1 (1965) ("[T]he comment in 155 A.L.R. 157 [ ] found that
many courts also regard 'foreseeability' to be an essential element in the definition of 'proximate
cause,' but that there was a sharp conflict of authority upon that question. On one side of the
controversy, it was found that some courts state the definition of 'proximate cause' in terms of
'foreseeable' or 'natural and probable' consequences, and take the view that although a defendant may
have been 'negligent,' his liability is limited to consequences which were 'reasonably foreseeable,' not
in exact detail, but in general form, and that injury or harm which was 'unforeseeable' or not a 'natural
and probable consequence' of the original 'negligent conduct' was not 'proximately caused' by such
'negligence.' On the other side were the courts which take the ostensibly contrary position and hold or
state that 'foreseeability' of harm is an essential element of 'negligence' or a test of the 'scope of duty,'
but that when the duty is defined and the defendant's negligence is established, then 'foreseeability' is
not a factor to be taken into consideration in deciding whether the defendant's 'negligent conduct' was
a 'proximate' or 'legal' cause of the injury or harm, so that consequently a 'negligent' defendant will be
liable for all the 'natural and ordinary' or 'direct' consequences of his conduct whether such
consequences were 'reasonably foreseeable' or not.").
51 Goldberg's interpretation of the statute fails to comport with the Restatement (third) of Tort's
understanding of proximate cause, which Goldberg himself adopts in his letter to Feinberg. The
Restatement also uses foreseeability as a gauge and defines proximate cause as "a separate filter beyond
actual causation, by which liability is excluded for harms that are so haphazardly caused as to not count
as the realizationof one of the risks that rendered the actor's conduct careless". See Memorandum from
John C.P. Goldberg to Kenneth Feinberg (November 22, 2010), supranote 23, at 20 n. 41.
52 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. N.R.D.C. Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n. 9 (1984) (holding that where the
court is left with the conclusion that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue, that
intention is the law and must be given effect); see supra text accompanying note 38.
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alone phrase "result from" in statutory texts, the courts have commonly
read in both an actual causation and a proximate cause requirement. 53
However, it is clear as a matter of judicial policy that courts will not use a
gap-filler type device to override the plain meaning of a statute. 54 Such a
presumption will only be used where there is an ambiguity in the Act with
no clear language evincing the drafters' intention. 55 Here, however, there is
no ambiguity because of the intentional exclusion of proximate cause
language. Thus, without a concrete showing of an explicit proximate cause
requirement in the statute, which Goldberg has failed to do, the inference of
intentional exclusion stands and the judicial presumption is not applicable
here.
B. A Comparisonof Interpretations:OPA, CERCLA, and TAPAA

Goldberg continues his argument in favor of the inclusion of a proximate
cause requirement by looking at the judicial interpretation of two statutes
that served as statutory predecessors of OPA.56 The "resulting from"
language of both CERCLA and TAPAA was interpreted by United States
Courts of Appeals to include a proximate cause requirement, even without
such explicit inclusion. 57 Goldberg claims that because these statutes
impose liability on "facially broader" terms58 than OPA, OPA's "secondlayer causation requirement" makes the finding of a proximate causation
element "irresistible". 59 However, by distinguishing the statutory
53 See Memorandum from John C.P. Goldberg to Kenneth Feinberg (November 22, 2010), supra
note 23, at 20 (stating that it has long been common for lawyers to use such phrases to encompass
notions of both actual and proximate cause).
54 United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 491 (1997) ("We do, of course, presume that Congress
incorporates the common-law meaning of the terms it uses if . . . 'the statute [does not] otherwise
dictate."' (citing Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322 (1992) (quoting Community
for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739 (1989))).
55 See Wells, 519 U.S. at 499; see also Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 65 (1995).
56 Memorandum from John C.P. Goldberg to Kenneth Feinberg, supra note 23, at 21-23 (arguing
for the adoption of the interpretations of CERCLA and TAPAA in the analysis of OPA); see
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1980);
see also Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act 43 U.S.C. §1653(c)(1) (1973).
57 Benefiel v. Exxon Corp., 959 F.2d 805, 807 (9th Cir.1992) (holding that Congress envisioned
damages arising out of the physical effects of oil discharges and not the remote and derivative damages
of the type claimed by the plaintiffs in this case); State of Ohio v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 880 F.2d 432,
472 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (adopting traditional causation standards, including proximate causation, in light
of ambiguity in the statute).
58 Goldberg is referring to the "resulting from" and "result of' language in CERCLA and TAPAA,
respectively. See Memorandum from John C.P. Goldberg to Kenneth Feinberg, supranote 23, at 21-23.
59 Goldberg asserts this proposition using an afortioriargument. He claims that if the courts read
in a proximate cause requirement in CERCLA and TAPAA which contain only one level of causation,
all the more so, will courts impute such a requirement on to OPA which contains a dual leveled
causation requirement via the reading of § 2702(a) together with § 2702(b)(2)(E). See supra text
accompanying note 40. This type of a fortiori argument is known as a minore ad maius argument,
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construction of OPA from CERCLA and TAPAA, this note will
demonstrate that such a finding is in fact very much resistible.
TAPAA Section 1653(c)(1) stipulates that the owner and operator of a
vessel shall be strictly liable, without regard to fault, in accordance with the
provisions of this subsection for all damages, including clean-up costs,
sustained by any person or entity, public or private, including residents of
Canada, as the "result of' discharges of oil from such vessel. 60 This
provision was the subject of the case Benefiel v. Exxon Corporation.6 1

Benefiel was a case arising out of the Exxon Valdez oil spill. 62 The
plaintiffs in the case purchased gasoline in California during a specified
period following the spill. 63 They brought an action to recover damages
representing what they claimed was the increased price they were required
to pay as a result of the spill. 64 The court ultimately rejected the plaintiffs
claims on proximate cause grounds. 65 In deciding the case, the court
interpreted the "result of" language in TAPAA to incorporate a required
showing of proximate cause. 66 The court supported its finding stating that
"we are confident that Congress in enacting TAPAA did not intend to
abrogate all principles of proximate cause". 67
However, because of a distinction in the statutory construction of OPA,
the Benefiel court's interpretation of TAPAA may not be superimposed

onto OPA. The only causation language that TAPAA includes is the "result
of' language the court cited in the Benfiel decision. 68 TAPAA does not
include explicit "proximate cause" language elsewhere in the statute, such
that would trigger the inference of intentional exclusion. 69 OPA on the
other hand, as explained above, does include explicit "proximate cause"
language elsewhere in the statute. 70 Thus, the Benefiel court was permitted
to import uniformly accepted principles of common law (namely a
proximate cause requirement) because there was no contrary language in
which denotes an inference from smaller (or weaker) to bigger (stronger).
60 43 U.S.C. § 1653(c)(1) (1973).
61 Benefiel, 959 F.2d at 806.
62 Id.
63 Id.
6 Id.
65 Id. at 807 (holding that the TAPAA is aimed at "damages arising out of the physical effects of
oil discharges. The remote and derivative damages of the type claimed by the plaintiffs here fall outside
the zone of dangers against which Congress intended to protect when it passed TAPAA.").

66 Id.
67
68
69
70

Id.
See Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1653(c)(1) (1973).
See generally Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act 43 U.S.C. §§ 1651 et seq.
Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. § 2704(c)(1) (1990); see supra text accompanying note 40.
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the statute to rebut this presumption. 7 1 A similar treatment of OPA,
however, would be outside the scope of the judiciary as the statutory
construction of OPA includes an inference of intentional exclusion of this
principle. 72
A comparison of OPA with CERCLA yields strikingly similar results.
CERCLA Section 9607(a)(4)(C) provides that any person who accepts or
accepted any hazardous substances for transport from which there is a
release shall be liable for damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of
natural resources, including the reasonable costs of assessing such injury,
destruction, or loss "resulting from" such a release. 73 The D.C. Circuit
Court in State of Ohio v. United States Department of the Interior was
presented with challenges to many aspects of CERCLA, all of which
focused on the regulations' alleged undervaluation of the damages
recoverable from hazardous materials spills that despoil natural resources. 74
The challenge relevant to this note's analysis was whether the "resulting
from" language in Section (a)(4)(C) required proof of actual cause or
proximate cause. 75 Upon a finding that the statute was ambiguous as to this
point of law, 76 the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit embarked on a
thorough analysis of CERCLA and its legislative history for guidance as to
the appropriate causation standard.77 The court ultimately upheld the
Department of Interior's reading of the statute, which adopted traditional
causation standards, namely the inclusion of both actual cause and
proximate cause. 78
Like with TAPAA, the court's interpretation here may not be
superimposed on to OPA because of a crucial difference in statutory
construction. Unlike in OPA, where Congress included the term
"proximately" elsewhere in the statute (implying the purposeful exclusion
71 United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 491 (1997) ("We do, of course, presume that Congress
incorporates the common-law meaning of the terms it uses if . . . "'the statute [does not] otherwise
dictate."' (quoting Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739 (1989) (citing
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322 (1992))); see Benefiel v. Exxon Corp., 959 F.2d
805, 807 (1992) (adopting a conclusion consistent with uniformly accepted principles of the common
law of torts).
72 Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. §2704(a)-(c) (1990); see supra text accompanying notes

35-36.
73 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(C) (1980) (providing broad Federal authority to respond directly to
releases or threatened releases of hazardous substances that may endanger public health or the
environment).
74 880 F.2d 432, 438 (D.C. Cir.1989).
75 Id. at 470.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 470-72.
78 Id. at 472.
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of it in Section 2602(b)(2)(E)), the term "proximately" does not appear in
the entirety of CERCLA.79 Without this variation in statutory construction
to introduce an inference of congressional intention, the court in Ohio was
permitted to import traditional common law principles of causation to
resolve the ambiguity of the phrase "resulting from."8 0 What is additionally
interesting is that the court in Ohio held that the "resulting from" language,
without the interpreting value of on-point legislative history, in CERCLA
rendered the statute ambiguous.8 1 Thus, contrary to Goldberg's argument,
the "result from" language does not offer courts an automatic cue to infer
notions of actual and proximate causation. 82 Rather, as evinced by this
court's treatment of the issue, such a finding is appropriate only after the
court has exhausted its efforts in determining Congress's intended meaning
of the statute. 83
C. Legislative History

This last section of Part I of this note will support the interpretation of
OPA's economic damages provision to exclude a proximate causation
standard through a brief assessment of House and Senate reports. The
House Conference Report provides a provision-by-provision background
for all of OPA.84 Insofar as Section 2704, the OPA provision that provides
for limits on liability for responsible parties and explicitly includes the term
"proximately,"8 5 the House Report mirrors the section's clear language
requiring a showing of proximate cause. The report reads, "Liability is
unlimited if the incident was proximately caused by gross negligence,
willful misconduct. ... "86
However, with respect to Section 2702(b)(2)(E), the provision on
damages for lost profits and impaired earning capacity, the House Report

79 See generally 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1989).
80 State of Ohio v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 472 (1989); see Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
N.R.D.C. Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n. 9 (1984).
81 Ohio, 880 F.2d at 470 (concluding that CERCLA was ambiguous as to proof of causation).
82 Memo from John C.P. Goldberg to Kenneth Feinberg, supra note 23, at 20 ("Indeed, even when
confronted with statutory liability provisions that use variants on the phrase "result from" as a standalone causation requirement, courts have read into that phrase both an actual causation requirement and
a proximate cause limitation - the latter excluding liability for certain remote consequences. They have
done so because it has long been commonplace for lawyers and courts to use these sorts of phrases to
encompass notions of both actual and proximate cause.").
83 Ohio, 880 F.2d at 472.
84 H.R.REP.No. 101-653 (1990).
85 33 U.S.C. § 2704(c)(1) (1990) (providing that the limits on liability set forth in subsection (a) do
not apply if the incident was caused by gross negligence by the responsible party).
86 H.R. REP. NO. 101-653, at 9.
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gives no indication that it was Congress's intent to include an implied
proximate cause standard. 87 The Report gives no indication that it intended
to import accepted common law principles of causation either. 88 Rather, the
report reads:
Subsection (b)(2)(E) provides that any claimant may recover for loss
of profits or impairment of earning capacity resulting from injury to
property or natural resources. The claimant need not be the owner of
the damaged property or resources to recover for lost profits or
income. For example, a fisherman may recover lost income due to
damaged fisheries resources, even though the fisherman does not own
those resources. 89
This section of the House Report identifies the classic (b)(2)3(E)
claimant: the individual who suffers a loss in profits as a result of damages
to real or personal property, or natural resources even though he does not
own such property or resources. 90 The singular causation requirement that
the House Report, as well as the statute itself, puts on recovery is that the
loss of profits or impaired earning capacity result from the injury to
property or natural resources. 91
This concept of a broad causation requirement is echoed in the 1990
Senate Report. 92 This Report says that the Section (b) damages provisions
"are intended to provide compensation for a wide range of injuries and are
not so narrowly focused as to prevent victims of an oil spill from receiving
reasonable compensation." 93 This statement, taken together with the
statutory text, makes the argument of an implied proximate cause
requirement highly attenuated at best. In fact, such an argument seems to
expressly conflict with Congress's underlying policy of providing recovery
for a wide range of cases as such a requirement would place a de facto
limitation on those who could recover. 94
For instance, consider the situation of the beachfront resort owner in St.
Petersburg, Florida who has not sustained damage to his property or natural
87 See generally HR. REP. No. 101-653 (1990). Also note that nowhere in the House Report is
there any mention of the "dual leveled" causation argued by Goldberg. Id.
88 H.R. REP.No. 101-653, at 9(1990).
89 Id.
90 Id. Here, the legislative intent shows a clear departure from the rule in Robins Dry Dock, which
required that economic losses stem from damage to property or resources owned by the claimant. 275
U.S. 303, 309-10 (1927).
91 H.R. REP. No. 101-653, at 9.
92 S. REP. No. 101-94 (1990).
93 Id. at 12.
94 Id;Deborah S. Bardwick, The American Tort System's Response to Environmental Disaster: The
Exxon Valdez Oil Spill as a Case Study, 19 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 259, 262 (2000).
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resources but is suffering a dramatic loss in profits because his clientele
believes the beach is covered in crude oil and is opting to vacation
elsewhere. 95 Under this interpretation, the resort owner may not be eligible
to recover under OPA Section 2702(b)(2)(E) because in addition to
showing actual causation, which would require a showing that the loss in
profits was a result of the damage to the Gulf Coast, the owner would have
to show proximate causation. Such a showing would require the resort
owner to show that his lost profits were a foreseeable consequence of the
spill, and that there was no superseding cause severing the causal nexus
running between BP and the profit loss. 96 Then, the resort owner would
have to overcome opposing counsel's arguments that the decline in
reservations had no other cause, such as the recent economic recession, the
opening of a higher end, yet less expensive resort down the beach, or the
failure of the resort to effectively market to their clients and keep the resort
in a favorable public opinion.
Thus, the inclusion of a proximate cause requirement in OPA Section
2072(b)(2)(E) would effectively frustrate Congress's goal of creating a
wide-reaching statute that increases oil spill victims' access to adequate
compensation for their losses. 97
III. THE CAUSATION STANDARD IN SECTION 2702(B)(2)(E):
THE JUDICIARY WEIGHS IN (SORT OF)

A scholarly analysis of OPA, or any statute for that matter, would not be
complete without an investigation of interpretations offered by the courts.
In the matter of OPA, there is a limited number of generally relevant cases
and even fewer cases that have offered interpretive value to the statute.
Moreover, the cases that focus on the causation element in Section
2702(b)(2)(E) do not offer a definitive answer as to what the appropriate
causation standard should be. 98 While the courts do not rule as to the
95 See David Segal, Should BP's Money Go Where the Oil Didn't?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2010, at
BUl (evaluating the issue of proximity claims in the wake of Deepwater Horizon). See also text
accompanying notes 1-5; see also Deborah S. Bardwick, The American Tort System's Response to
Environmental Disaster: The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill as a Case Study, 19 STAN. ENvTL. L.J. 259, 275

(2000).

96 Yun v. Ford Motor Co., 647 A.2d 841, 846 (App. Div. 1994); Bardwick, supra note 95, at 279.
97 S. REP. No. 101-94, at 12 (1990); Robert Force, Martin Davies & Joshua S. Force, Deepwater
Horizon: Removal Costs, Civil Damages, Crimes, Civil Penalties, and State Remedies in Oil Spill
Cases, 85 TUL. L. REv. 889, 893 (2011).
98 See, e.g., Gatlin Oil Co. v. U.S., 169 F.3d 207, 210-11 (1999) (holding that the removal costs
and damages in section 2702(b) are those that "result from" a discharge of oil or from a substantial
threat of a discharge of oil into navigable waters or the adjacent shoreline, but providing no greater
clarification on the causation standard in this section of OPA); Robert Force, Martin Davies & Joshua

838

JOURNALOFCIVL RIGH7S & ECONOMICDEVELOPMENT

[Vol. 26:4

correct standard of causation, the decisions as to the existence of questions
of fact bear on what causation standards the courts are willing to
recognize. 99
Dunham-Price Group v. Citgo Petroleum Corp. was brought before the
United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana after an
oil spill in the Calcasieu River. 0 0 In response to the spill, the U.S. Coast
Guard ordered the closure of approximately twenty-two miles of the river
for cleanup operations.ol Dunham-Price, a concrete facility, alleged that it
sustained increased expense, business interruption and related damages as a
result of the spill.1 02 Dunham-Price argued that Section 2702(b)(2)(E) of
OPA does not mention or require a direct causal link between a claimant's
economic losses and damage to property or natural resources; in other
words, Dunham argued the exclusion of a proximate cause requirement.10 3
While the court did not explicitly express support in favor of this reading, it
did find that Dunham had demonstrated genuine issues of material fact that
should be decided by a trier of fact.104 Such a holding strongly indicates
that the court would not object to a jury finding sufficient causation under
the broad causation standard proffered by Dunham.105
Similarly, in In Re Settoon Towing, the plaintiff sought recovery for
economic losses under Section 2702(b)(2)(E) after an oil spill cleanup
operation blocked access to its production platform.' 0 6 While applying
OPA to the case, the court looked first at the traditional maritime tort law
and noted that under these principles the plaintiff would be precluded from
recovery because the plaintiff alleged economic damages too remote to
property damage.10 7 However, the court held that OPA damages provisions
S. Force, Deepwater Horizon: Removal Costs, Civil Damages, Crimes, Civil Penalties, and State
Remedies in Oil Spill Cases, 85 TUL. L. REv. 889, 900 (2011).
99 See Dunham-Price Group v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31901, at *8
(W.D.La. 2010) (denying summary judgment to defendant oil company where as a result of a temporary
closure of a waterway after an oil spill, plaintiff sustained loss use, increased expense, and business
interruption); see also In Re Settoon Towing, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113530, at *13 (E.D.La. 2009)
(denying summary judgment to defendant oil company where plaintiff had suffered damages as a result
of its inability to access its production platform while an oil spill cleanup was in progress).
100 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31901, at *1, 1-2.
101 Id.at*2.
102 Id.
103 Id. at *4 ("Dunham-Price insists that [OPA] does not mention or require a direct causal link
between a claimant's economic losses and damage to property or natural resources.").
104 Id. at *8 (relegating the decision as to whether Dunham-Price's economic losses are due to
Citgo's oil spill to a trier of fact).
105 Id.
106 Settoon Towing, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113530, at *8.
107 Id. at *11 ("[Plaintiff] does not allege that it suffered physical injury to a proprietary interest,
but rather economic damages that are remote to ExPert's property damage that was allegedly caused by
Settoon's negligence. Thus, pursuant to the Rule of Robins Dry Dock and its progeny, if [plaintiffs]
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preempt general maritime law and found that the plaintiff raised genuine
issues of material fact as to whether the economic losses were due to the
property damage resulting from the discharge of oil.l 0 8 Thus, while the
court did not clearly find for the exclusion of a proximate cause
requirement in Section 2702(b)(2)(E), it did lay the groundwork for such a
conclusion. 10 9 First, the court's acknowledgment of OPA liability as
something separate and unique from traditional maritime tort liability
allows for the premise that OPA extends liability differently than traditional
tort law."l 0 Second, the finding of an OPA preemption over traditional
liability allows for a conclusion that where there is a divergence in the law,
such as the requirement of a proximate cause showing, OPA will prevail.111
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF SECTION (B)(2)(E) AND THE ARGUMENT FOR THE
ADOPTION OF THE RADIAL CAUSATION DOCTRINE

The reading of OPA Section 2702 suggested in this note delegitimizes
Ken Feinberg's decision to deny payment to claimants that cannot show
proximate cause. 112 Pursuant to the manifested intent of Congress and the
formulation of OPA, claimants such as the resort owner in Florida with no
damage to his property or the restaurateur in New York or an out of work
fisherman in New Orleans who cannot maintain his supply contracts,
should be granted relief for their lost profits and impairment of earning
capacity.11 3 Using this analysis of OPA, claimants would be responsible for
showing that their economic losses were due to the property damage
resulting from the discharge of oil in the Gulf, among the other elements
listed in Part 1.114 There would be no requirement that these claimants
claim against ExPert were made under the general maritime law, they would be precluded.").
108 Id. ("However, the OPA damages provision preempts the general maritime law.") (citing
Gabarick v. Lourin Mar. (Am.) Inc., 623 F. Supp.2d 741, 746 (E.D.La. 2009)).
109 Seeid.at*l1-12.
110 See id.
Ill See id.
112 See http://www.gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com/proto_1.php, Para. II.F. ("The GCCF will only pay
for harm or damage proximately caused by the spill. The GCCF's causation determinations of OPA
claims will be guided by OPA and federal law interpreting OPA and the proximate cause doctrine.");
CRUDE JUSTICE - ONE YEAR AFTER THE GULF OIL SPILL: IS JUSTICE BEING SERVED? (2011),

http://www.afj.org/connect-with-the-issues/the-corporate-court/crudejustice/.
113 See generally text accompanying notes 21-110.
114 Chalos, supra note 36 at 87 (listing the elements necessary for recovery under OPA Section
2702(b)(2)(E) as:
That real or personal property or natural resources were injured or lost; and
The claimant's income was reduced resulting from injury to, destruction of, or loss of property or
natural resources and the amount of the reduction; and
The amount of the claimant's profits or earnings in comparable periods and during the period when the
claimed loss or impairment was suffered, established by income tax returns, financial statements, etc.)
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further prove that the spill was the proximate cause of the loss.
While it seems clear that OPA does not contain a proximate cause
requirement, a question remains as to whether it should contain such a
limitation mechanism. Consider the magnitude of potential liability
stemming from this policy. Oil pollution is "the natural consequence of the
world's increased dependence on oil to satisfy industrial needs and basic
energy requirements." 1 15 Each year thousands, if not millions, of tons of
crude are released into the sea as a result of tanker accidents.'1 6 Under
OPA, the liability associated with these accidents is dangerously farreaching and potentially unlimited.11 7 While it is crucial, as a matter of
public policy, to offer protection to those impaired as a result of oil spills, it
is similarly in the public's best interest to prevent frivolous and remote
claims from being filed.1S Moreover, it is a fundamental concept of tort
law that liability must be discontinued eventually.11 9 So while some
limitation on recovery is undoubtedly necessary, given the magnitude of
damage and global reach of marine oil pollution, a proximate cause
requirement remains an untenable solution because it would prevent
recovery for most claimants.
One way of resolving these competing interests while providing greater
certainty to OPA is rooted in the general practice of current oil spill claims
management. Most claims administrators consider a series of factors in
determining whether to pay claims of economic loss. These factors include
geographic proximity, time, foreseeability, and scope of economic loss
sustained (amount and percentage of total revenues). The resolution this
note would like to propose, called the Radial Causation Doctrine, takes
these considerations and codifies them in a systematic fashion. Taking into
115 3-1X Benedict on Admiralty §111.
116

See THE INTERNATIONAL TANKER OWNERS POLLUTION FEDERATION LIMITED, STATISTICS:

NUMBERS AND AMOUNTS OF SPILLS (2009), http://www.itopfcom/information-services/data-andstatistics/statistics/#no; see also THE DUMPING OF HYDROCARBONS FROM SHIPS INTO THE SEAS AND
OCEANS OF EUROPE: THE OTHER SIDE OF OIL SLICKS (2009), oceana.org/sites/default/files/reports/oil-

report-english.pdf
117 This is because OPA's broad "due to" causation requirement provides for a wide range of
injuries and are not so narrowly focused as to prevent victims of an oil spill from receiving reasonable
compensation. S. REP. No. 101-94, at 12 (1990); RAWLE 0. KING, DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL
DISASTER:
RISK,
RECOVERY,
AND
INSURANCE
IMPLICATIONS
(2010),
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41320.pdf
118 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (requiring that an attorney perform a due diligence investigation
concerning the factual basis for any claim or defense so as to prevent the costliness and time consuming
nature of frivolous lawsuits).
119 Yun v. Ford Motor Co., 647 A.2d 841, 846 (App. Div. 1994) (describing proximate cause as a
standard for limiting liability for the consequences of an act based "'upon mixed considerations of
logic, common sense, justice, policy and precedent."' (quoting Scafidi v. Seiler, 574 A.2d 398, 402
(1990) (quoting Caputzal v. The Lindsay Co., 222 A.2d 513, 517 (1966)))); City of Philadelphia v.
Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 277 F.3d 415,423 (2002).
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account the highly politicized nature of the claims process, as well as
practical solutions developed in the field, this proposal avoids a bright-line
rule in favor of a balancing test. 120
The Radial Causation Doctrine organizes claims into four concentric
circles. 12 1 In the center circle are claimants who suffered economic losses
directly tied to the damage of their real or personal property or natural
resources. 122 This includes, for instance, a fisherman whose fishing vessel
was destroyed in the explosion of a barge and has thus lost his source of
livelihood, as well as beachfront resort whose shoreline is actually steeped
in crude oil. Here, the claimant need only show that the economic loss was
due to the damage caused by the spill.
In the next outward circle are claimants in a clearly delineated
geographic periphery to the spill who do not allege damage to their
property but have nonetheless suffered an economic loss. 12 3 This stage
includes, for example, coastal resorts within a certain number of miles from
the spill whose beaches are unharmed but who have suffered reputational
harm and have lost reservations. This stage might also include restaurants,
bars and other tourist venues within this previously delineated geographic
area who have suffered economic losses. Moreover, this stage would
include claimants whose economic injuries are more indirect yet are still
located within this periphery. An example could be a manufacturer
similarly located along the coast that supplies the beer to the bars and
restaurants which have cancelled their contracts as a result of diminished
reservations. Even further, the distributor who supplies that manufacturer
with glass bottles could collect if he too is located within this geographic
range and has suffered economic loss.1 24 These claimants, as well, need
120 This note contemplates that the Radial Causation Doctrine be adopted by means of amendment
to OPA, or via regulations enacted by the National Pollution Funds Center, the administrative agency
created by the U.S. Coast Guard to implement Title I of OPA.
121 Claims resulting from instances of marine oil pollution, such as Deepwater Horizon, are often
described as extending outwards like a concentric circle with ripple effects felt all over the country. See
John Kennedy, Surviving the Big, Oily Mess, 850 MAGAZINE (Aug. 11, 2010), available at
http://850businessmagazine.com/component/content/article/37-its-the-law/408-getting-what-bp-owesyou.html. This concept served as inspiration for the Radial Causation Doctrine. Furthermore, multifactor tests are commonly used in the context of maritime law. See also Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditus,
398 U.S. 306, 308 (1970). Such a test is used to determine whether a particular ship owner should be
held to be an "employer" for Jones Act purposes. Id. See attached diagram for a visual understanding of
the Radial Causation Doctrine.
122 This circle is comprised of claimants who would be eligible for recovery under the traditional
Robins Dry Dock rule which required that economic losses stem from damage to property or resources
owned by the claimant. 275 U.S. 303, 309 (1927); Byrd v. English, 117 Ga. 191, 194 (1903).
123 The exact limits of this periphery would need to be determined by experts who have experience
in third party claims stemming from spills of oil and other hazardous materials.
124 Such claimants would likely be unable to show proximate cause and thus be barred from
collecting under Feinberg's interpretation of OPA. Under this model, however, they would be eligible
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only show that the loss sustained was due to the spill.
The next stages include claimants who suffer economic damages (but do
not allege property damage) and are located outside that geographic
periphery. The first circle in this range affects claimants who have suffered
economic loss, who are geographically located outside the periphery, but in
the generally affected region of the spill. This might include, for example,
manufacturers who have supply contracts with entities within the affected
area: for instance the T-shirt manufacturer who cannot sell 10,000 "I love
Pensacola" shirts located 100 miles from the spill. Here, such claimants
may collect but they have a higher burden of causation to satisfy. First, they
must show that their losses were due to the spill, just as the inner circles of
claimants must show. Second, these claimants must show an additional
level of reliance and loss. Whereas the inner circles could recover for any
economic loss sustained, this circle must show that the loss of profits
comprised a certain percentage of their overall business. Claimants can
satisfy this standard by showing that the loss in profits comprised a certain
percentage of gross earnings that created a particular reliance on the lost
business. Another factor taken into consideration is the duration and
strength of the business relationship. For instance, if the T-shirt
manufacturer who claims economic damage had been supplying thousands
of T-shirts a year to the Pensacola region for the past 15 years and this
production comprises a significant percentage of his earnings then he will
be eligible to recover. On the other hand, a manufacturer located outside
the periphery who has had only occasional contractual dealings with the
resorts along the coast that amount to only a sliver of his overall business
could not collect.
The outermost circle includes claimants who have suffered economic
loss and are located outside the region affected by the spill. This circle
includes claimants on the other side of the country, as well as the other side
of the world. One example could be the restaurateur in New York who can
no longer import fish from the region affected by the spill. Claimants in
this category have the highest burden of causation to satisfy. In addition to
the showing that the economic loss was due to the spill, and that the loss
comprised a certain percentage of his overall business, this claimant is also
charged with a showing of proximate cause. The claimant must show that
his loss was a foreseeable consequence of the spill.
These parameters are meant to function as a statutory floor. In other
words, claims administrators could award damages to more claimants than
to recover.
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the proposal provides for, but they may not provide less. This allows for
claims administrators to exercise their judgment in situations that are
highly politicized and demand careful attention, yet still protect those who
sustain economic loss as a result of oil spills.
CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the finding against the inclusion of a proximate cause
requirement in OPA Section 2702(b)(2)(E) proffered in this note is
consistent with Congress's intent to provide compensation for a wide range
of claimants injured in the wake of oil spills. This finding is supported by
the plain meaning of the statute, legislative history, judicial decisions
regarding OPA, and a comparison with OPA's statutory predecessors.
Consequently, Ken Feinberg's decision to require a showing of proximate
cause is inconsistent with OPA. Adoption of the Radial Causation Doctrine
suggested in this note provides clarity to the otherwise ambiguous question
of where OPA cuts off liability. This doctrine will provide a limit for
potentially infinite liability while still protecting those harmed most by the
spill. Until a statutory mechanism such as this is adopted, or the courts
come to a definitive conclusion regarding the limits of OPA liability, a
plethora of oil spill victims will be denied their right to compensation.
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THE RADIAL CAUSATION DOCTRINE
Circle 1: Claimants who have suffered
losses tied directly to the damage of their
real or personal property. This includes,
for instance, a fisherman whose fishing
vessel was destroyed in the explosion of a
barge and has thus lost his source of
livelihood, as well as a beachfront resort
whose shoreline is actually steeped in
crude.
Claimant need only show that economic
damage was due to the spill.

Circle 2: Claimants in a clearly delineated
geographic periphery who do not allege
damage to their property but nonetheless
suffer economic damages. This stage
includes, for example, coastal resorts within a
certain number of miles from the spill whose
beaches are unharmed but who have suffered
reputational harm and have lost reservations.
This stage might also include restaurants, bars
and other tourist venues within this
previously delineated geographic area who
have suffered economic losses
Claimant need only show that economic
damage was due to the spill.

Circle 3: Claimants outside the geographic
periphery, but still within the generally affected
region of the spill who do not allege damage to
their property but nonetheless suffer economic
damages. . This might include, for example,
manufacturers who have supply contracts with
entities within the affected area: for instance the T
shirt manufacturer who cannot sell 10,000 "I love
Pensacola" shirts located 100 miles from the spill.
Claimants must show that economic damage was
due to the spill, and that the loss ofprofits
compriseda certainpercentage ofgross earnings
such that there was a particularreliance on the
profits lost.

Circle 4: Claimants have suffered
economic loss but are located outside
the region affected by the spill who do
not allege damage to their property but
nonetheless suffer economic damages.
One example could be the restaurateur
in New York who can no longer
import fish from the region affected by
the spill.
Claimantsmust proveproximate
cause.

